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Abstract
In a bilateral trade framework, we examine the impact of tari⁄reduction on the op-
timal pollution tax and social welfare when pollution is transboundary. Strategic
considerations lead countries to distort their pollution tax in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Trade liberalization changes the distortion, and consequently the pol-
lution tax and welfare, in ways that depend on the extent to which pollution is
transboundary. We ￿nd that when the pollution damage parameter is su¢ ciently
small (large), bilateral tari⁄ reduction always decreases (increases) the pollution
tax, irrespective of the value of the transboundary pollution parameter. However,
when the pollution damage parameter takes intermediate values, bilateral tari⁄
reduction decreases the pollution tax if and only if the transboundary pollution
parameter is su¢ ciently large (or even su¢ ciently small, in certain cases). More-
over, with pollution being transboundary, the impact of trade liberalization on
welfare is non-monotonic and concave. The greater the extent to which pollution
crosses borders, the more likely is trade liberalization to reduce welfare.
JEL classi￿cations: F18; Q58; H23; D43
Keywords: Transboundary pollution; Strategic trade; Bilateral tari⁄ reduc-
tion; Pollution tax
21 Introduction
A continuing concern amongst environmentalists is that expanded interna-
tional trade may harm the environment. It is feared that competitive pres-
sures generated by freer trade will force governments to relax their environ-
mental policies in a ￿race to the bottom￿ . The transboundary nature of
many pollutants will make it even less likely that globally e¢ cient environ-
mental policies are pursued by individual countries acting non-cooperatively.
A growing body of literature has examined these concerns (see, for exam-
ples, Krutilla, 1991; Barrett, 1994; Kennedy, 1994; Antweiler, et al., 2001;
Copeland and Taylor, 2003).1 While identifying situations where countries
may strategically weaken their environmental regulations in order to cap-
ture additional gains from trade (labeled as the ￿rent capture￿e⁄ect), the
literature has also pointed out other situations where trade can improve en-
vironmental quality. The latter can happen, for instance, as a consequence
of higher demand for environmental quality that emerges as national income
grows with international trade.2
For the case where capital is immobile across countries, the rent capture
e⁄ect has been illustrated by Kennedy (1994a). When ￿rms compete in
terms of quantities, reducing domestic ￿rms￿environmental costs makes them
more competitive internationally, enabling a country to capture additional
rents from its trading partners. Equilibrium pollution taxes can be subjected
to other distortions as well. A desire to shift polluting production from
itself to its trading partners can motivate a country to ine¢ ciently increase
its pollution tax. Moreover, to the extent that pollution is transboundary,
1Most of the literature on trade and environment has focused on consumption rather
than production externalities. Some of the few papers that analyze pollution as a produc-
tion externality in this context are Copeland and Taylor (1999), and Benarroch and Thille
(2001).
2Countries may also relax their environmental regulations in order to attract interna-
tionally mobile capital (Markusen, et al., 1995). Conversely, strategic behaviour among
trading countries can lead to tighter environment policies when imperfectly competitive
￿rms compete in terms of prices (Barrett, 1994).
3pollution taxes chosen by individual countries taking into consideration only
their own pollution damage (but not that of other countries) will be set too
low. Kennedy (1994a) concludes that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the net
impact under free trade is a lowering of the pollution tax below its e¢ cient
level. In a related paper, Kennedy (1994b) considers two policy instruments
￿a pollution tax and a production subsidy ￿and analyzes strategic incentives
of trading countries to distort them from their e¢ cient levels.
While Kennedy identi￿es how the equilibrium pollution tax may be dis-
torted under free trade, Burguet and Sempere (2003) examine how trade
liberalization (in the form of bilateral tari⁄ reduction) a⁄ects environmental
policy and welfare by changing the various distortionary forces.3 Using a
model of bilateral trade with imperfect competition and local pollution, the
authors show that trade liberalization can make environmental policy either
more or less stringent, depending on various factors such as the convexity of
the damage function and the emission intensity of output. On the one hand,
by increasing output, trade liberalization increases marginal social cost of
output, which tends to tighten environmental policy. On the other hand,
lower tari⁄s imply lower import (export) revenue (cost) which tends to make
environmental policy more lax. The net impact on equilibrium environmental
policy depends on the relative strength of these counteracting forces. Fur-
thermore, Burguet and Sempere (2003) show that, when the environmental
policy instrument is a pollution tax, marginal social cost is always less than
price. Consequently, by increasing output, a bilateral tari⁄reduction always
increases welfare of each country.
While Burguet and Sempere consider purely local pollution, the present
paper analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on pollution tax and welfare,
when pollution is transboundary. Many pollutants (such as SO2, greenhouse
gases, and toxic chemicals) impose detrimental externalities (e.g. acid rain,
3Burguet and Sempere (2003) consider various environmental policy instruments such
as pollution tax and standard.
4global warming, and pollution of the Great Lakes in North America) on
countries that are di⁄erent from the country where the pollutants originated.
As a result, even in the absence of international trade, pollution taxes can be
set too low when countries set their tax non-cooperatively. Much pollution
in the world as such involves two international dimensions ￿international
trade in polluting goods and the cross-boundary nature of the associated
pollution. Taking into account both these dimensions, and their interaction,
then becomes important for getting a fuller understanding of the impact of
freer trade on environmental protection and welfare.
We use a model of bilateral trade with imperfect competition, and repre-
sent transboundary pollution by a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]. This ￿transboundary
pollution parameter￿￿ is the fraction of pollution that spills over from one
country to its trading partner. Di⁄erent values of the parameter allow us to
consider a continuum of cases ranging from strictly local pollution to per-
fectly transboundary pollution. The extent to which pollution is transbound-
ary turns out to be a crucial determinant of the impact of trade liberalization
on pollution tax and welfare. This is because the magnitude of the strategic
distortions that the pollution tax is subjected to depends on the extent to
which pollution crosses borders. In particular, the incentive of each coun-
try to increase its tax and shift polluting production to the other country
becomes smaller when pollution is more transboundary in nature.
We ￿nd that when the pollution damage parameter is su¢ ciently small
(large), liberalizing trade always decreases (increases) the pollution tax, irre-
spective of the value of the transboundary pollution parameter. In contrast,
when the pollution damage parameter takes a low range of intermediate val-
ues (de￿ned later), trade liberalization always decreases the optimal pollution
tax for strictly local pollution but increases the tax if pollution is moderately
transboundary. Alternatively, when the pollution damage parameter takes a
high range of intermediate values, trade liberalization always increases the
optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but decreases the tax if pol-
5lution is su¢ ciently transboundary. Further details of this result are provided
in Proposition 1.
The impact of reducing tari⁄ protection on the welfare of each country
is also shown to depend on the extent to which pollution is transboundary.
When pollution is purely local, we ￿nd that a bilateral tari⁄reduction always
increases welfare (as in Burguet and Sempere (2003)). However, when pollu-
tion is transboundary, welfare of each country is shown to be non-monotonic
and concave in the tari⁄ level. Marginal bilateral tari⁄ reduction then im-
proves welfare if and only if the initial tari⁄ rate exceeds a threshold value,
which itself is a positive function of the transboundary pollution parameter.
An implication is that the (direction of) change in welfare of a country due
to marginal bilateral reductions in the tari⁄ rate may not be the same as
that due to a discrete jump in tari⁄ (to free trade, for example).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and derives the equilibrium. The e⁄ect of bilateral trade liberalization
on the optimal pollution tax and on welfare are analyzed in sections 3 and
4 respectively. Section 5 provides two numerical examples in support of our
propositions. The last section concludes.
2 The model
Consider two identical countries, Home and Foreign, with segmented mar-
kets. There are n ￿rms in each country, with n ￿ 1. All ￿rms produce a
homogeneous good and face a constant marginal cost of production, given by
c: Each Home (Foreign) ￿rm sells x (y) units of the good in the Home market
and x￿ (y￿) units in the Foreign market. Foreign variables are denoted by
the superscript ￿￿￿ .
In each market, ￿rms compete in quantities, i.e. ￿ la Cournot. Demand
6in each country is identical and given by:
p(q) = a ￿ q
where a > c; and q is total quantity sold in the relevant country. Each country
charges a tari⁄at the same rate of z per unit of import from the other country.
The tari⁄ is given exogenously in our model, and trade liberalization takes
the form of equal bilateral reduction in the tari⁄ rate. This, for example,
re￿ ects the situation subsequent to the signing of free trade agreements (such
as CUSTA and NAFTA) between countries.
A by-product of production in this industry is pollution. It is assumed
that, for every unit of output produced, the ￿rms emit one unit of pollu-
tion.4 The pollution is transboundary and ￿ 2 [0;1] fraction of pollution
generated in one country a⁄ects the other country. Di⁄erent values of the
￿transboundary pollution parameter￿ , ￿; allow us to consider a continuum of
cases ranging from strictly local pollution (￿ = 0) to perfectly transboundary
pollution (￿ = 1).
The damage from pollution is monotonically increasing and convex in the
level of emissions a⁄ecting a country. The damage functions in Home and
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￿ (n(y + y
￿) + ￿n(x + x
￿))
2 (2)
where ￿ ￿ 0 is the pollution damage parameter. In (1) and (2); n(x + x￿)
denotes the total production undertaken in Home and n(y + y￿) the total
production undertaken in Foreign. The environmental policy in each country
is a tax imposed per unit of emission by domestic ￿rms.5 The pollution (or
4For simplicity, we abstract away from modeling abatement by the ￿rms. Allowing
￿rms to choose their level of abatement will not change our results qualitatively.
5Given our assumption of constant emission intensity of output, a tax per unit of
7emission) tax is denoted as t and t￿ for Home and Foreign, respectively.
The sequence of moves is as follows. In the ￿rst stage, (an environmental
authority in) each country chooses its pollution tax to maximize the country￿ s
own welfare, taking the other country￿ s pollution tax (and tari⁄s in both
countries) as given. In the second stage, each ￿rm takes the policies set by
the countries and the output decisions of the (2n ￿ 1) other ￿rms as given,
and maximizes its pro￿ts. To obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
the model is solved by backward induction.
2.1 Second stage: Output decision of ￿rms
Let the total quantity sold in Home be Q = n(x + y) and that in Foreign be
Q￿ = n(x￿ + y￿): Each Home ￿rm chooses x and x￿ to maximize its pro￿t
max
x;x￿ x(a ￿ Q) + x
￿(a ￿ Q
￿) ￿ (c + t)(x + x
￿) ￿ zx
￿ (3)
Similarly, each Foreign ￿rm chooses y and y￿ to maximize its pro￿t
max
y;y￿ y(a ￿ Q) + y
￿(a ￿ Q
￿) ￿ (c + t
￿)(y + y
￿) ￿ zy (4)
The Cournot equilibrium quantities for the two markets are computed. The
quantities sold in Home and Foreign are given by:
x =




a ￿ c + nt ￿ (n + 1)t￿ ￿ (n + 1)z
2n + 1
(6)
emission is equivalent to a tax per unit of the polluting good.
8x
￿ =





a ￿ c + nt ￿ (n + 1)t￿ + nz
2n + 1
(8)
We assume that parameter values are such that each of the above quan-
tities is positive. Total production in Home is n(x + x￿), total consump-
tion in Home is n(x + y) and, using (6) and (7), net import of Home is
n(y ￿ x￿) = n(t ￿ t￿). Home￿ s net import thus depends positively on Home￿ s
pollution tax and negatively on Foreign￿ s pollution tax. Similarly, net import
of Foreign is n(x￿ ￿ y) = n(t￿ ￿ t).
2.2 First stage: Optimal environmental policy
In the ￿rst stage of the game, each country chooses the pollution tax that
maximizes its own welfare (the ￿optimal pollution tax￿ ), taking as given the
tari⁄level and the other country￿ s pollution tax.6 Social welfare is taken to be
the sum of consumer surplus; producer surplus; tari⁄ revenue and pollution
tax revenue less pollution damage: In Home, social welfare, W; is given by
W (t;t
￿) ￿ CS + PS + TR + ER ￿ D (9)
where consumer surplus CS = 1
2 (n(x + y))





tari⁄ revenue TR = zny, pollution tax revenue ER = tn(x + x￿); and pol-
lution damage D is as given by (1).
The ￿rst order condition for welfare maximization,
@W(t;t￿)
@t = 0; yields
an expression for Home￿ s optimal tax, t(t￿), which is a function of Foreign￿ s
tax, t￿; and the other parameters in our model. The second order condition
6In general, the optimal tax chosen by each country in the non-cooperative equilibrium
will not be globally e¢ cient (Kennedy, 1994).
9for welfare maximization is satis￿ed since we have the following:
@2W (t;t￿)
@t2 = ￿n
24￿n2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + 4n(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + 1) + 4￿ + 3
(1 + 2n)
2 < 0
In a symmetric equilibrium, where both countries are identical, the pollu-
tion tax of each country will be equal. Hence, imposing t = t￿ in the expres-
sion for Home￿ s optimal tax, t(t￿); gives the Nash equilibrium optimal-tax
in each country as
t =
2n￿ (1 + ￿)(1 + n ￿ n￿)(2(a ￿ c) ￿ z) ￿ 2(1 + n)(a ￿ c ￿ nz) + z
4n((1 + ￿)(1 + n) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ n￿))
(10)
Three sources of market failure that in￿ uence the choice of the optimal
pollution tax in our model are as follows. First, there is the ￿transboundary
externality e⁄ect￿that tends to lower t (from its globally e¢ cient level), as
each country ignores the impact of pollution created within its boundary
on welfare in the other country. Second, there is the ￿rent capture e⁄ect￿
that also works to lower the optimal pollution tax. Since the imperfectly
competitive ￿rms enjoy rents, each government has a strategic incentive to
provide a competitive advantage to its domestic ￿rms so that they are able
to capture more foreign rent. Third, there is a ￿pollution-shifting e⁄ect￿
(or a NIMBY, not-in-my-backyard, e⁄ect) that tends to increase t, as each
country tries to drive polluting production from itself to the other country.
The transboundary externality e⁄ect and the pollution-shifting e⁄ect de-
pend on the extent to which pollution crosses jurisdictions. As ￿ increases
from 0 to 1, the former e⁄ect becomes stronger while the latter e⁄ect becomes
weaker. Note that when the good is clean (i.e. ￿ = 0), both these e⁄ects are
non-existent. Moreover, the rent capture e⁄ect disappears when the market
becomes competitive (i.e. as n ! 1). The optimal pollution tax (10) in






10As long as there is positive tari⁄, each country enjoys tari⁄ revenue on im-
ports and has to pay for exports. This gives them an incentive to substitute
foreign production for domestic production, and consequently to tax domes-
tic ￿rms (the ￿tari⁄ e⁄ect￿on the optimal pollution tax). Only when trade
is free (i.e. z = 0) as well, will the welfare-maximizing pollution tax rate (11)
for each country be zero.
The interaction of the above-mentioned e⁄ects determines the choice of
the optimal pollution tax. Note that, from (10), we have @t
@￿ ￿ 0 if and only if
￿ ￿ 1
2n. Higher values of the transboundary pollution parameter, ￿; increases
the optimal pollution tax, t, if and only if ￿ is su¢ ciently small.
In a symmetric equilibrium, substituting t = t￿ = t in (5)-(8), we have
total output produced equal to total output consumed in each country, so
that its net import is zero. The total output, produced or consumed, in each
country is
Q = n(x + x
￿) = n(x + y) =
1
2
2(n + 1)(a ￿ c ￿ z) + z
(1 + ￿)(n + 1) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿n)
A bilateral tari⁄ reduction leads to an increase in total output as
@Q
@z < 0 for
￿ 2 [0;1].
3 Impact of bilateral tari⁄ reduction on op-
timal pollution tax
The impact of bilateral tari⁄ reduction on the previously mentioned e⁄ects
determines how reducing protection a⁄ects the optimal pollution tax by al-
tering the tradeo⁄ between these e⁄ects. As shown below, the extent to
which pollution crosses borders plays a pivotal role in the determination of
the net impact of these e⁄ects.
The impact of bilateral trade liberalization on the optimal pollution tax




1 + 2n(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + n) ￿ 2￿n￿ (1 ￿ n￿)
4n(1 + n + ￿ (1 + ￿) + n￿ (1 ￿ ￿2))
(12)
The denominator of (12) is positive for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. The sign of @t
@z; therefore,
is the same as that of the numerator of (12), which is quadratic and convex
in the transboundary pollution parameter ￿. As such, the two roots in terms
of ￿ that satisfy @t


























(2n2 + 2n + 1)
￿
(14)
The above roots are real if and only if
￿ ￿ 2
2n2 + 2n + 1
(2n + 1)
2 ￿ ￿1 (15)
Moreover, ￿L ￿ 0 if and only if
￿ ￿
2n2 + 2n + 1
2n(n + 1)
￿ ￿2 (16)
and ￿H ￿ 1 if and only if
￿ ￿
2n2 + 2n + 1
4n
￿ ￿3 (17)
Notice that the above-de￿ned threshold values of the pollution damage pa-
rameter are related as follows: 1 < ￿1 < ￿2 ￿ ￿3 for all n ￿ 1. Proposition
1 follows.
12Proposition 1:
(i) Suppose the pollution damage parameter is small, i.e. ￿ < ￿1. Then the
roots of ￿, as given by (13) and (14) are imaginary, and we have @t
@z > 0 for
all ￿ 2 [0;1]. Bilateral trade liberalization decreases the optimal pollution tax
for all values of the transboundary pollution parameter in this case.
(ii) When ￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿2, we have @t
@z ￿ 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿L or ￿ ￿ ￿H.
Bilateral trade liberalization decreases the optimal pollution tax only when the
transboundary pollution parameter is su¢ ciently small or su¢ ciently large.
(iii) When ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3, we have @t
@z ￿ 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿H. Bi-
lateral trade liberalization decreases the optimal pollution tax only when the
transboundary pollution parameter is su¢ ciently large.
(iv) When the pollution damage parameter is very large, i.e. ￿3 < ￿, we have
@t
@z < 0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. Bilateral trade liberalization increases the optimal
pollution tax for all values of the transboundary pollution parameter in this
case.














0 for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. Note that @t
@zj￿= 1
2n ￿ 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿1; @t
@zj￿=0 ￿ 0 if
and only if ￿ ￿ ￿2; and @t
@zj￿=1 ￿ 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿3.￿
Proposition 1 shows that when the pollution damage parameter is su¢ -
ciently small (large), a bilateral tari⁄ reduction always decreases (increases)
the optimal pollution tax, irrespective of the value of the transboundary pol-
lution parameter. However, when the pollution damage parameter takes in-
termediate values, bilateral trade liberalization is likely to reduce (increase)
the optimal pollution tax for extreme (intermediate) values of the trans-
boundary pollution parameter. Speci￿cally, when the pollution damage pa-
rameter takes a low range of intermediate values (￿1 ￿ ￿ < ￿2), bilateral
tari⁄ reduction decreases the optimal pollution tax if and only if the trans-
boundary pollution parameter is su¢ ciently small (￿ < ￿L) or su¢ ciently
large (￿ > ￿H). Alternatively, when the pollution damage parameter takes
13a high range of intermediate values (￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3), bilateral tari⁄ reduc-
tion decreases the tax if and only if pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary
(￿ > ￿H).
The above results can be explained as follows. As output increases and
price falls with trade liberalization, it increases the generation of and dam-
age from pollution, but decreases rents. Consequently, a country￿ s incentive
to raise tax and drive out polluting production increases, but its incentive
to lower tax and capture additional rents decreases. These exert an upward
pressure on the optimal pollution tax. However, a lower tari⁄ also reduces
tari⁄ revenues from imports and the cost of exports. This reduces the coun-
try￿ s incentive to substitute foreign production for domestic production by
increasing the tax. As a result, the optimal pollution tax tends to decrease.
The net impact on the tax depends on the relative strength of the two coun-
teracting forces.
The incentive for a country to raise its tax and drive out polluting pro-
duction depends on both the pollution damage parameter as well as the
transboundary pollution parameter. For instance, when pollution is largely
harmless and/or largely transboundary in nature, each country has little in-
centive to drive out polluting production (either because pollution damage is
too small or because pollution ￿ ows back even when production moves out).
Consequently, the pollution shifting e⁄ect is weak and, with trade liberaliza-
tion, the upward pressure (mentioned above) on the pollution tax is likely to
be dominated by the downward pressure. Trade liberalization tends to lower
the optimal pollution tax in such cases.
In the special case when pollution is purely local, using (12) with ￿ = 0,
we have @t
@zj￿=0 ￿ 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿2. Thus, if the pollution damage
parameter took a value such that ￿1 < ￿ < ￿2, trade liberalization would
always decrease the optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but will
increase the tax if pollution is moderately transboundary (i.e. ￿L < ￿ < ￿H).
Similarly, when ￿2 < ￿ < ￿3, trade liberalization would always increase
14the optimal pollution tax for strictly local pollution but will decrease the
tax if pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary (i.e. ￿ > ￿H). Ignoring the
extent to which pollution crosses borders, while analyzing the impact of trade
liberalization on optimal environmental policy, is therefore likely to lead to
inaccurate conclusions.
4 Impact of bilateral tari⁄ reduction on wel-
fare
The maximized welfare of each country, denoted as W, can be derived by
substituting t = t￿ = t into W (t;t￿), where t is the optimal pollution tax
given by (10) and W (t;t￿) is given by (9). Resultantly, we get
W =
[2(a ￿ c)(n + 1) ￿ z (2n + 1)]
￿
z (2n + 1)
￿
￿ (￿ + 1)
2 + 1
￿
+ 2(a ￿ c)((1 + n)(￿ + 1 ￿ ￿￿2) ￿ 2n￿￿ (1 + ￿))
￿
8(￿ (￿ + 1)(n + 1 ￿ n￿) + n + 1)
2






2￿￿ (a ￿ c)(￿ + 1) ￿ z
￿
￿ (￿ + 1)
2 + 1
￿￿
4(￿ (￿ + 1)(n￿ ￿ n ￿ 1) ￿ 1 ￿ n)
2 (18)
The following result holds.
Proposition 2: In the presence of transboundary pollution, a marginal bi-
lateral tari⁄ reduction leads to an increase in the welfare of each country (i.e.
@W




Proof: Follows from (18). ￿
By increasing output, tari⁄ reduction increases marginal social cost and
15reduces price. Whether this increases welfare of a country, or not, depends
on whether initially price exceeds marginal social cost of output, or not, in
that country. When pollution is cross-boundary (i.e. ￿ > 0), Proposition
2 indicates that welfare is non-monotonic and concave in z. The turning
point corresponds to the threshold value of tari⁄, z1. It is only when tari⁄
is su¢ ciently high (z > z1), and the associated output su¢ ciently low, that
price exceeds marginal social cost. An increase in output, that emerges as a
result of bilateral tari⁄reduction, then increases welfare. The opposite result
holds when z < z1:
Notice that the threshold value of tari⁄, z1, is an increasing function of
the transboundary pollution parameter ￿ (i.e.
@z1
@￿ > 0). An important policy
implication arises: the more transboundary is pollution, the less likely it is
that trade liberalization will improve welfare. In contrast, when pollution is
purely local (i.e. ￿ = 0), trade liberalization always improves welfare as (18)
implies @W




In this section, we provide two numerical examples in support of our analyt-
ical results.
Example 1: Suppose the previously-de￿ned parameters in our model take
the following values:
a = 100; c = 0; n = 2; z = 1
Then from (15), (16), and (17) we have the threshold values of the pollution
damage parameter as ￿1 = 1:04, ￿2 = 1:08, and ￿3 = 1:62. Figure 1
7Burguet and Sempere (2003), who assumed local pollution, found a similar result
(Proposition, p. 31): ￿If the environmental instrument is a tax (either on output, input,
or emissions), a bilateral reduction in tari⁄s increases welfare.￿
16plots @t
@z, as given by (12), for various values of the transboundary pollution
parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]. The four U-shaped lines in Figure 1 correspond to four
di⁄erent values of the pollution damage parameter: ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1:06, ￿ = 1:3,
and ￿ = 1:7 (these choices of ￿-values are dictated by the above threshold
values). The sign of @t
@z for di⁄erent values of ￿ and ￿ in Figure 1 provide
validation for Proposition 1. It is interesting to note that, when ￿ = 1:06,
reducing tari⁄ protection decreases the optimal pollution tax if and only if
the transboundary pollution parameter is su¢ ciently small (i.e. ￿ < 0:08) or
su¢ ciently large (i.e. ￿ > 0:42).
In our symmetric equilibrium, when t = t￿ = t, we have x = y￿ and
x￿ = y (i.e. quantity sold by a Home ￿rm at Home equals quantity sold by a
Foreign ￿rm at Foreign, and quantity sold by a Home ￿rm at Foreign equals
quantity sold by a Foreign ￿rm at Home). These quantities are plotted in
Figures 2 and 3 for the above mentioned parameter values. It is seen that
all the quantities are positive, as required.
Example 2: This example is in support of Proposition 2. Suppose the
parameter values are
a = 100; c = 0; n = 2; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:1
Then the threshold value of the tari⁄, as de￿ned in Proposition 2, is z1 = 9:
95.
Suppose the prevailing tari⁄rate is z = 1. Then the optimal pollution tax
is t = 38:37, quantities are x = y￿ = 12:73 and x￿ = y = 11:73, and welfare
is W = 2247:5. Moreover, from (18), we have @W
@z = 3:35 > 0. Thus a
marginal bilateral tari⁄ reduction causes welfare of each country to decrease
in this case. For instance when tari⁄ falls to z = 0, welfare decreases to
W = 2243:9.
Alternatively, suppose z = 12. Then t = 38:49, x = y￿ = 17:1, x￿ = y =
5:1, and W = 2261:7. Moreover, from (18), we have @W
@z = ￿0:76 < 0. Thus
17a marginal bilateral tari⁄ reduction leads to an increase in welfare in this
case. For instance when tari⁄falls to z = 11, welfare increases to W = 2262:
2.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on the op-
timal pollution tax and welfare, when pollution is transboundary. Account-
ing for the cross-boundary nature of pollution is important because much
of worldwide pollution exhibits such a characteristic. This tends to make
non-cooperatively set pollution taxes ine¢ cient from a global perspective.
Within such a second-best world, we analyze how changing (reducing) one
policy instrument, the tari⁄rate, changes the optimal value of another policy
instrument, the pollution tax, and the associated welfare in symmetric coun-
tries. Such an analysis is topical in a world where the move towards freer
trade has left countries with less control over their tari⁄policy. The latter, in
turn, has motivated some countries to use environmental policy instruments
in order to achieve trade policy objectives (Ederington and Minier, 2003).
The extent to which pollution is transboundary a⁄ects the magnitude of
the pollution shifting e⁄ect and the tradeo⁄between this e⁄ect, the rent cap-
ture e⁄ect, and the tari⁄ e⁄ect. Liberalizing trade changes the tradeo⁄, and
is shown in the paper to a⁄ect optimal pollution tax and welfare in ways that
depend on the transboundary pollution parameter. We ￿nd that when the
pollution damage parameter takes lower intermediate values, bilateral tari⁄
reduction increases the pollution tax if and only if pollution is moderately
transboundary. On the other hand, when the pollution damage parameter
takes higher intermediate values, bilateral tari⁄ reduction decreases the tax
if and only if pollution is su¢ ciently transboundary (Proposition 1).
Further, when pollution is transboundary, we ￿nd that the impact of bi-
lateral trade liberalization on welfare is non-monotonic and concave (Propo-
18sition 2). Marginal tari⁄ reduction then improves welfare if and only if the
initial tari⁄ rate exceeds a threshold value. The more transboundary is pol-
lution, the higher is this threshold value and the less likely it is that trade
liberalization will improve welfare. Another implication for policy is that
welfare changes due to marginal bilateral changes in the tari⁄ may be an in-
accurate predictor of welfare changes due to discrete jumps in tari⁄ (to free
trade, for example). For purely local pollution, however, trade liberalization
always improves welfare.
Our paper examines the analytically simpler case of symmetric countries
with linear demand. Nevertheless, the role of transboundary pollution in the
determination of the impact of trade liberalization should remain crucial and
qualitatively similar even when these simplifying assumptions are relaxed.
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